


Wisconsin

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Institute
Report



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**GETTING
MILWAUKEE
TO WORK**


*Antipoverty Strategy Where
the Rubber Meets the Road*

Report from the President:

Mark Hughes is one of the most impressive researchers we have hired over the last 6 years. Along with his academic relationships with Harvard and the Brookings Institution, he is also a consultant with the Ford Foundation, developing new approaches to the serious problems of American urban poverty.

In this study he examines what has happened to Milwaukee over the last twenty years by using data from the 1990 Census. We have separated his graphs from the text of the report because they portray a visual picture of the changes in Milwaukee since 1970. What is important here is that Milwaukee is simply mirroring the rest of the country. Our central cities are becoming much poorer and more segregated. Jobs which used to be in the central city are now overwhelmingly being created in the outer areas of the metropolitan regions. Suburbs are no longer bedroom communities but are becoming the economic engines for metropolitan regions. Milwaukee is different in that most jobs are still in the central city, but it is also following the national trend with the suburbs and outer rings emerging as the future place for new economic growth.

Hughes points out that the two traditional kinds of approaches for economic development for poor people were job creation in the central city and/or dispersal of poor people to the suburbs. He adds a new idea to this mix. Hughes' view is that mobility may be the most practical solution for Milwaukee. He believes that we should transport poor people to the jobs and worry about the social implications later. He also points out that the Job-Ride program is one of the most innovative programs in Wisconsin. Clearly this idea should be encouraged in the future; mobility is the key. The inner city poor need jobs and those jobs are much more likely, in the future, to be in the outer rings of Milwaukee than in the central city.


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GETTING MILWAUKEE TO WORK

Antipoverty Strategy Where the Rubber Meets the Road

by

Mark Alan Hughes, Ph.D.

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GETTING MILWAUKEE TO WORK
Antipoverty Strategy Where the Rubber Meets the Road

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Executive Summary In this report, we present new findings from the 1990 Census to document changes during the last twenty years in the demographic and economic conditions of metropolitan Milwaukee. In particular, we present the striking divergence of conditions in the city and the surrounding suburbs. Among our findings:

Suburbanization is a powerful trend:

A growing majority of the metropolitan population resides outside the city. While most jobs are still in the regional center, seven out of ten new jobs were located outside the city.

But there is a strong racial cast to this suburbanization:

Thirteen of twenty white persons in the region reside in the suburbs, but fewer than one of twenty black persons in the region reside in the suburbs.

And there are large city/suburb differences in poverty:

In 1970, the city poverty rate was three times higher than the suburban rate. In 1990, the city poverty rate was seven times higher than the suburban rate.

This geography of race and class has profoundly changed the city of Milwaukee:

Within the city boundaries, the ghetto quadrupled in both area and population from 1970 to 1990. (Ghetto is defined as neighborhoods in which poor African-Americans represent more than one-third of all residents.)

Thus, the data present a dual pattern of concentrating poverty in the city and deconcentrating opportunity toward the suburbs. Faced with this pattern, policymakers have traditionally followed two policies: disperse the residences of poor blacks from city to suburbs using judicial and other remedies and/or develop inner-city economies using financial and other incentives to attract firms away from the suburbs. A third strategy, however, recognizes the political constraints on dispersal and the economic constraints on development. This mobility strategy attempts to connect inner-city residents with suburban job openings via innovative information and transportation policies. This third approach is being tried in metropolitan Milwaukee through an innovative program discussed here.

Background

In a number of recent studies, Milwaukee has emerged as one of the nation's most distressed metropolitan areas. For example, Milwaukee was one of only a dozen metropolitan areas to lose population during the 1970s. Furthermore, one recent study ranked metropolitan Milwaukee as 47th among the 60 largest metropolitan areas in terms of employment growth during the late 1970s, and it ranked 50th during the most recent period, 1980-1986.¹

Also, metropolitan Milwaukee ranked as one of the nation's most segregated urban areas. In one prominent study of residential segregation between whites and blacks, Milwaukee scored among the highest on five different measures of segregation, leading the authors of the study to characterize metropolitan Milwaukee as one of six metropolitan areas that were "hyper-segregated" in 1980.²

Finally, the 1970s also witnessed severe trends in poverty in the region, especially among African-Americans. One study has documented the startling increase in "ghetto poverty" in the Milwaukee metropolitan area.³ The authors of this study defined ghetto poverty as the percentage of poor blacks living in census tracts where the black poverty rate is over 40 percent. Therefore, "ghetto poverty" is a measure of the concentration of poor blacks. The level of ghetto poverty increased from 16.6% in 1970 to 39.2% in 1980. In absolute terms, the number of poor blacks living in ghetto neighborhoods increased from 4,819 to 17,063---an increase of over 250%. These numbers may seem small, but they are significant compared to the size of Milwaukee's black population. In 1970, fewer than *one in twenty* black persons in metropolitan Milwaukee were among the ghetto poor. In 1980, nearly *one in eight* black persons were among the ghetto poor.

These studies all present findings based on the 1980 Census. They present some important dimensions of socioeconomic change in the region: employment growth and relocation, residential segregation between ethnic groups, and size and concentration of the poverty population. Metropolitan Milwaukee was demonstrably one of the most distressed urban areas in the nation during the 1970s. But what of more recent evidence? The just-released 1990 Census affords the opportunity for a timely update.

¹ Anita A. Summers and Peter Linneman, "Patterns and Processes of Urban Employment Decentralization in the U.S. 1976-1986" and Peter Linneman and Anita A. Summers, "Patterns of Urban Population Decentralization in the United States 1970-1987" (Working Papers, University of Pennsylvania, July 1990).

² Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas" in *Demography* (1989, 26:373-391).

³ Paul A. Jargowsky and David Ellwood, "Ghetto Poverty: A Theoretical and Empirical Framework" (Working Paper, Harvard University, October 1990).

In this report, we consider changes in the levels and location of poverty and opportunity in the Milwaukee area. We employ the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses and a special dataset of employment location (not directly available in Census data) in the region during the period 1976-1986. The next section of the report presents changes in population in the city and the suburbs, 1970-1990. There was extensive change in the distribution of population across the metropolitan area, and in the racial composition of the city, the suburbs and neighborhoods within the city. The second section of the report documents changes in poverty and unemployment levels and their location in the region. There was a large increase in the city's poverty and unemployment rates and in the concentration of poverty within specific neighborhoods of the city. In the third section of the report, we place these changes in the context of employment change in the region. There has been a considerable suburbanization of jobs during the 1970s and 1980s. In the final section of the report, we present a policy strategy for confronting concentrated poverty in the context of deconcentrating opportunity.

1. Demographic Change

It is useful to discuss local conditions in the context of national benchmarks. In this section and each of the following sections, we compare the specifics of metropolitan Milwaukee with a more general discussion of trends across the nation. The 1990 Census reveals an important change in the way Americans live and work. For the first time a majority of the U.S. population (about 125 million of a total of 250 million persons) lives in metropolitan areas with populations of one million or more. There are 39 of these large metro areas, and they demonstrate the central importance of these huge, complex settlements to the life of the nation.

While we were creating this system of large metropolises, however, we also reinvented them. No longer dominated by the cities at their historic centers, two-thirds of the population of these large metropolitan areas reside outside the central cities. Figure 1 presents the city and suburban populations of these large metropolitan areas during the last two decades. Whereas the population of "large cities" (defined as the central city and any other cities over 200,000 in the metropolitan area) hardly increased during the period, the suburban population (defined as the metropolitan population outside large cities) increased over 50% from about 55 million to about 85 million. During the past twenty years the nation's large metropolitan areas (where most Americans live) have become heavily suburbanized, and now twice as many people reside in the suburbs than in the large cities of these metro areas.

Metropolitan Milwaukee is less suburbanized than this national average, but the trends of the last two decades have been dramatic. Figure 2 presents the same city/suburb measures for Milwaukee. During the period, the total population in

metropolitan Milwaukee edged up slightly (by about 30,000 persons between 1970 and 1990). But there was a substantial change in where that population resides. In 1970, the city and the suburbs each had a population of about 700,000. By 1990, the suburban population *increased* by 120,000 persons, while the city population *decreased* by 90,000 persons. Since the 1970s, a growing majority (56% by 1990, of the metropolitan population) resides outside the city.

The first of many examples shows a strong racial difference in these location patterns. Figure 3 shows the city/suburban population trends for white persons. There were about 100,000 more whites in the suburbs in 1990 than in 1970. More dramatically, there were 200,000 fewer whites in the city by 1990. Figure 4 presents the same measures for African-Americans in metropolitan Milwaukee. The number of African-Americans living in the city increased by 85,000. Although there was an enormous percentage increase in the number of suburban blacks (a statistic often reported with optimism in research reports and newspaper accounts), the actual numbers remained very low: fewer than 6 thousand African-Americans lived in the Milwaukee suburbs in 1990---out of a total suburban population of over 800,000. In short, white suburbanization is over twenty times greater than black suburbanization (66% versus 3%).

This difference has had a profound effect on the racial composition of the city. Figure 5 displays the black and white composition of total city population in 1970, 1980 and 1990. As the figure shows, total population has declined, white population has declined, and black population has increased. In 1970, the city of Milwaukee was less than 15% African-American. By 1990, the percentage had increased to 30%. Meanwhile, the racial composition of the suburbs remained roughly constant, with African-Americans comprising less than 1% of suburbanites throughout that period.

Furthermore, African-Americans remained concentrated within particular neighborhoods of the city itself. Figure 6 displays the number of African-Americans residing in census tracts with varying percentages of black residents. For example, the right-most column shows that in 1990 over 70,000 African-Americans lived in tracts in which 90% or more of their neighbors were black. Similarly, the left-most column shows that in 1980 less than 10,000 African-Americans resided in tracts in which 0-9% of the tract population was black. (Note that in 1990---the adjacent column to the right---the number of African-Americans living in these nearly all-white neighborhoods had decreased.) This is a truly graphic illustration of the level of segregation at the neighborhood level within the city of Milwaukee. Most African-Americans in the city of Milwaukee reside in virtually all-black neighborhoods (defined as those which are 80% or more black).

The next series of figures shows this concentration abstract by mapping the concentration of African-Americans during the period 1970-1990. Figures 7 through 9 show the location of these neighborhoods. The figures display the census tracts of the city in each year. The shading of each tract indicates the percentage of the residents who are African-American. For example, all tracts in which 20 to 39 percent of the residents are black are shaded with vertical hatching and all tracts in which 40 to 59 percent of the residents are black are shaded with cross hatching. Furthermore, the figures are annotated to show the number of black and number of total residents in each type of neighborhood. For example, Figure 7 is annotated to read that in 1970, 61,562 persons (of whom 56,546 were African-American) lived in tracts in which 80 to 100 percent of their neighbors were African-American. Similarly, Figure 7 shows that only 8,149 African-Americans (and 587,225 persons in total) lived in tracts which were less than 20 percent black in 1970.

Figure 7 reveals that in 1970 over 90% of the city's black population resided in neighborhoods in which the percentage of blacks exceeded the citywide average (of 15%). A tract with any shading at all is 20% black or more. All of these tracts are shown in the figure (which is a close-up of the inner city just northward of the central business district). Thus, nearly all of the city's (and therefore of the region's) African-American population resided in an area roughly four miles across. Furthermore, the center of this area of black settlement was nearly all black, with over half (56,546) of the region's African-American population living in tracts which were virtually all black (80% or more). Meanwhile, less than 2% of the region's black population lived outside the city of Milwaukee (compared to 49% of the total population).

Figure 8 displays these neighborhood patterns in 1980. During the 1970s, there was an increase in the city's black population of 40% (from 105,088 to 147,055) and a large territorial expansion of black neighborhoods (defined by the percentage of blacks in the census tract). By this date, the area of black settlement (tracts with any shading at all) stretched nearly eight miles northwesterly from the Milwaukee River. This expansion occurred as many neighborhoods opened up to African-Americans. There was an increase in the number of blacks living in virtually all-white (from 8,149 to 14,489) neighborhoods and a large increase in the number of blacks living in mixed neighborhoods (nearly quadrupling from 4,007 to 15,908). However, there was also an increase in the number of African-Americans living in virtually all-black neighborhoods (from 56,546 to 88,515) and an increase in the percentage of African-Americans living in virtually all-black neighborhoods (from 54% to 60% of all blacks). While there was some increase in racially mixed neighborhoods, the most extreme conditions of racial segregation appear to have worsened during the 1970s.

Figure 9 shows the patterns for 1990. Again, the city's black population increased during the 1980s, this time by 30% (from 147,055 to 191,259). There was again a territorial expansion in black neighborhoods, continuing the northwesterly path that opened up during the preceding decade. There was an increase in the number of African-Americans living in virtually all-white and in mixed neighborhoods. And although the number of African-Americans living in virtually all-black neighborhoods increased during the 1980s (from 88,575 to 104,944), the percentage of the city's black population living in these neighborhoods declined (from 60% to 55%) to approximately the same proportion as 1970.

So, the changes of the 1980s had mixed results. On one hand, a slightly smaller fraction of the city's growing African-American population lived in virtually all-black neighborhoods. On the other hand, the number of African-Americans living in these neighborhoods increased substantially. But perhaps most importantly, after two decades of black suburbanization, 97% of the region's African-Americans reside in the city and over half these people reside in census tracts in which 80% or more of the residents are black.

2. Socioeconomic Change

In addition to the changing demographic profiles of the city and suburbs, there have been profound changes in socioeconomic profiles as well. One of the most discussed changes in U.S. cities is the increase in poverty. Figure 10 displays the change in poverty rates in the nation's twenty largest cities between 1980 and 1990. The figure displays the poverty rate in each city for each year, and the cities are ranked by the percentage change in the poverty rate during the decade. For example, the poverty rate in Houston increased from about 13% in 1980 to about 21% in 1990, and this represented the largest percentage increase in poverty rates among the 20 largest cities. Detroit had the highest rate in 1990 by a large margin. Note that Milwaukee had one of the highest rates in 1990 and had the second highest percentage increase in rates during the 1980s.

In Figure 11, we return to our focus on city and suburban differences. The figure displays the number of city and suburban poor in 1970, 1980 and 1990. The number of persons in poverty declined in the suburbs from 28,528 in 1970 to 26,567 in 1990. In stark contrast, the number of poor persons in the city increased dramatically from 80,377 in 1970 to 135,583 in 1990, with most of this increase coming during the 1980s. In addition to examining the magnitude of poverty, it is useful to consider its incidence as well. If a place has twice as many persons in total, it would not be surprising for it to have twice as many poor persons as well. So the incidence, or rate of poverty, is a better method of comparing places. Figure 12 presents the city and suburban poverty rates during the period. There has been a steady rise in the city poverty rate and a modest decline in the suburban rate.

In 1970, the city rate was three times the suburban rate. By 1990, the city rate was seven times the suburban rate.

Again, there was a strong racial dimension to these changes. Figure 13 displays the number of white and black poor in the city. (The height of the bars in Figure 13 do not sum to the city totals in Figure 11 because of the presence of poor persons of other races. This "residual" is larger in each successive year reflecting the increasing diversity of Milwaukee beyond the traditional black/white categories.) In 1970, a large majority of the poor in Milwaukee were white. By 1990, there were nearly twice as many poor blacks as poor whites.

The concentration of poverty within neighborhoods has received much attention because it is a measure of the isolation of the poor and of the disadvantages associated with certain neighborhoods. Figure 14 shows the number of poor whites living in census tracts of varying levels of concentrated poverty. Note that, although there was an increase in the number of poor whites between 1980 and 1990, the number of poor whites living in nonpoor neighborhoods (typically defined as census tracts in which fewer than 20% of the residents are poor) actually declined. There was a large increase in the number of poor whites living in extreme poverty neighborhoods (defined as tracts with poverty rates of 40% or more). There were four times as many poor whites living in extreme poverty areas of the city in 1990 as in 1980.

However, the increase in concentrated poverty among African-Americans is even greater than among whites. Figure 15 shows the distribution of poor blacks across poverty neighborhoods. There were five times as many poor blacks living in extreme poverty neighborhoods in 1990 as in 1980.

Furthermore, the extent of concentrated poverty among African-Americans far exceeds that among whites. Figure 16 compares poverty concentration between blacks and whites in 1990. Note that the largest number of poor whites reside in nonpoverty neighborhoods (with poverty rates less than 20%) and that the number declines as the poverty rate increases. Thus, relatively few poor whites live in neighborhoods with large numbers of other poor people. The distribution of poor African-Americans across poverty and nonpoverty neighborhoods is very different. Nearly two-thirds of poor blacks live in extreme poverty neighborhoods (with rates exceeding 40%).

Once again, we try to make these ideas a bit less abstract by mapping the conditions they represent. Figure 17 presents what we label ghetto formation during the past two decades. This is the most complete figure presented thus far and requires some explaining. Most people think of the ghetto as intersection of race and poverty: the concentration of poor blacks in specific neighborhoods.

A neighborhood of poor whites is not typically thought of as a ghetto, nor is a neighborhood of middle-class blacks. It is the concentration of poor blacks that conventionally defines a ghetto, and thus we use the percentage of residents in a neighborhood who are black and poor to identify these neighborhoods. For simplicity, we define neighborhoods as ghetto or nonghetto (much as the Census defines people as poor or nonpoor). We define the ghetto as census tracts in which one-third or more of the residents are African-American and poor.

Figure 17 displays census tracts that meet this definition of ghetto formation and the census year in which they first exceeded the threshold. We display formation at three times: 1970, 1980 and 1990. We see the same pattern as in Figures 7 through 9: territorial expansion in a northwesterly direction. This expanding area of ghetto formation contained a *total* population of 16,493 in 1970 and 89,738 in 1990. Thus, in terms of both area and population, the Milwaukee ghetto quadrupled in size during the past 20 years.

These two simple definitions (of poverty and of ghetto neighborhoods) allow us to consider one of the more interesting questions regarding African-American community structure. Some scholars have suggested that in recent decades, nonpoor blacks have left the ghetto leaving behind increasingly isolated poor blacks.⁴ The table at the top of Figure 17 shows the number of poor and nonpoor blacks living inside and outside the ghetto in 1970 and 1990. Note that in 1970, 87% of nonpoor African-Americans lived outside the ghetto. By 1990, the number of nonpoor African-Americans increased significantly, from 70,349 to 109,237 (up 55% during the twenty-year period). But, the proportion of nonpoor blacks living outside the ghetto had fallen to 63% and, inversely, the fraction of nonpoor blacks living in the ghetto increased from 13% in 1970 to 37% in 1990. Similarly, the fraction of poor African-Americans living in the ghetto increased from 27% to 62%, and the number of poor blacks living in the ghetto increased nearly seven-fold from 7,401 to 49,153. Thus it was more likely that both poor and nonpoor African-Americans would reside in a ghetto neighborhood in 1990 than it was in 1970.

Figure 17 indicates that the story is, indeed, increased isolation among the black poor. However, the explanation appears to be less the exodus of nonpoor African-Americans leaving greater concentrations of poor blacks; but rather, the huge increase in black poverty, the resulting expansion of ghetto areas, and the continuing segregation of African-Americans into just a few neighborhoods.⁵ Thus, in 1970, 9 of 10 nonpoor blacks in Milwaukee were living in neighborhoods in which less than one-third of their neighbors were poor and black. By 1990, only

⁴ See especially, William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1987).

⁵ Consistent with Douglas Massey and Mitchell L. Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concentration of Poverty, 1970-1980" in *American Journal of Sociology* (1989, 95:1153-1188).

6 of 10 nonpoor blacks were living in such neighborhoods. And this appears to have happened because so many black neighborhoods had higher black poverty rates in 1990 than 1970 (as shown in the large number of "new" ghetto tracts displayed in Figure 17). Unemployment is an important contributor to poverty. In the next series of figures, we see trends in unemployment that are even more striking than the increase and concentration of poverty. Figures 18 and 19 display the number of unemployed persons and the unemployment rates for the city and the suburbs. During the 1970s, unemployment in the city and suburbs moved in tandem. During the 1980s, however, there was a remarkable divergence as unemployment increased dramatically in the city and decreased in the suburbs.

Figure 20 presents the changing racial composition of the city's unemployed. In 1970, there were four *times* as many unemployed whites as unemployed blacks. In 1990, there were actually fewer unemployed whites than unemployed blacks. And in Figure 21, we see the same pattern of concentration that we saw with poverty. The figure shows the distribution of Milwaukee's unemployed blacks and whites across high- and low-unemployment neighborhoods. Unemployed whites are far more likely than blacks to reside in census tracts with few other unemployed persons. In contrast, most unemployed African-Americans in 1990 in the city lived in tracts in which the unemployment rate exceeded 15%. Finally, in Figure 22 we locate concentrations of black unemployment. The map shows the census tracts in the city in which the black unemployment rate exceeds 20% in 1990 (double the rate for African-Americans in the city as a whole in that year). Unemployed blacks and black unemployment are concentrated in the ghetto neighborhoods of the city.

These patterns are consistent with completely divergent explanations. One interpretation is that African-Americans, for a variety of reasons, are poor, and that people who are poor live in lousy neighborhoods. Another interpretation is that African-Americans, for a variety of reasons, live in lousy neighborhoods, and that people who live in such places are likely to be impoverished by them. But regardless of whether one interprets location as cause, effect, or some complex combination of both, for the purposes of public policy the salient fact is that poverty concentration has increased. The population that both liberals and conservatives want to move from welfare to work, from poverty to prosperity, is increasingly concentrated and isolated in the inner city. We now turn to a discussion of employment change with hope of mapping the route from isolation to employment.

3. Employment Change

In this section of the report, we make use of a dataset developed by Peter Linneman and Anita Summers of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.⁶ Their dataset provides information on employment location for a set of areas throughout the Milwaukee metropolitan area. We illustrate the locations that are coded in the Wharton dataset in Figure 23. The figure shows all the minor civil divisions (towns and townships in the Midwest) in metropolitan Milwaukee with the thinner lines, and the employment zones (based on the postal geography used by the Small Business Administration) are shown with the thicker lines. As one can see from the figure, the city and an inner ring of adjacent suburbs are grouped together into a single zone which we will label the "center". The remaining employment zones we will refer to collectively as the "outer" parts of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

The Wharton dataset contains information on the nation's 60 largest metropolitan areas. This allows us to place Milwaukee into a national context. In Figure 24, we present the change in employment at the center and outer parts of all 60 MSAs for the ten-year period, 1976-1986. The figure shows that during this period there was an increase in outer jobs of over 8 million. Two-thirds of net metropolitan employment growth in these MSAs was located outside the centers. Finally, by the end of this period there were more jobs located in the outer than center parts of these metropolitan areas.

In Figure 25, we see these same numbers for the Milwaukee metropolitan area. The trend is the same as the national pattern: the outer parts of the region gained about twice as many jobs as the center during the period. But unlike the national pattern, the center remains the location of a majority of the region's jobs.

In order to understand changes in Milwaukee, however, we disaggregate the employment number into more specific sectors of the labor market. In particular, it's important to consider manufacturing jobs. These are the relatively higher pay and lower skill jobs that are most salient to the employment prospects of the poor and near poor. In Figure 26, again to provide some context, we present the number of center and outer manufacturing jobs for the 60 largest MSAs during the period 1976-1986. Here, among manufacturing employment, the trends established for total employment are even more dramatic. During the period, the centers actually lost a total of 200,000 manufacturing jobs while the outer areas gained 1.3 million manufacturing jobs.

⁶ Summers and Linneman, *op.cit.* A similar trend is documented by Sammis B. White, William F. McMahon, and Gregory F. Moots, "Restructuring of the Milwaukee Economy, 1979-1989", Urban Research Center, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, October 1992.

Again, in metro Milwaukee the trends are the same. As shown in Figure 27, the center lost nearly 20,000 manufacturing jobs during the period, while the outer areas actually gained 8,000. Here too, the local Milwaukee setting is somewhat different from that of the nation as a whole. During this period of net increase in manufacturing jobs nationwide, metropolitan Milwaukee endured a net decrease in manufacturing jobs. Just as in the national case, however, there is an important geographical bias to this story. The central zone witnessed a loss of manufacturing jobs during the period. While suburban growth in manufacturing in no way fully compensated for declines at the center, there was substantial growth in manufacturing growth in the suburban labor market.

In Figures 28 and 29, we repeat the data from Figures 25 and 27 in geographical form. Thus, we display the location of zones with the highest rates of growth in total jobs and manufacturing jobs during the period. These maps provide a telling illustration of what "everybody knows:" that the highest rates of job growth are found outside the city. For manufacturing, especially, suburban areas 20 and 30 miles from inner Milwaukee were doubling their number of jobs during this period. Again, the maps are presented to help make some of the statistics less abstract. The suburbs were the engines of employment growth during this period. There is little reason to believe that this trend has reversed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, the activities described in the next section strongly suggest that the trend continues to be important.

In the next section, we present some of the policy implications of the dual pattern of concentrated poverty and deconcentrating opportunity. We also describe some innovative programs designed to overcome the barriers to employment created by these changes.

4. Policy Implications

Inner-city poverty took on a new urgency in 1992 after the violence in Los Angeles, and there is a renewed call for reasonable solutions to the problems of cities and their residents. The current conventional wisdom calls for policies that give people "a greater stake in their communities." Such policies would include home ownership assistance and small business loans, and are epitomized by urban enterprise zones. These zones grant tax incentives to businesses established within impoverished areas of the nation's cities, such as south central Los Angeles. Enterprise zones represent a commitment to restore the inner city as a place in which people can improve their material status and prosper.

Antipoverty strategy must seek to make inner cities work again as places in which people can thrive and gain access to opportunities for self-sufficiency. In this regard, the broad goal of enterprise zones is surely correct. There are other ways to

meet this goal, however. As we have seen, people and jobs have been suburbanized so extensively that "suburb" no longer applies to many former bedroom communities. Furthermore, employment suburbanization was generally occurring much faster than population suburbanization. In many metropolises, outer areas were gaining jobs three times as fast as residents. This means that the function of the suburbs, their role within the metropolis, has changed dramatically. They are increasingly the engines of metropolitan employment growth, and not just a good place to raise kids.

At the same time, the function of the inner city has changed. The inner city was once accessible to employment. The ghetto was a part of an urban machine that created opportunity. Now that machine is broken for poor and black people, with its parts spread across the vast metropolitan landscapes created during the past decades.

There have been two policy alternatives for confronting ghetto poverty. Dispersal strategies seek to connect ghetto-dwellers with suburban opportunities by opening up the suburbs to poor and black residents. Development strategies, on the other hand, seek to connect ghetto-dwellers to opportunity by redeveloping the inner-city labor market via enterprise zones or otherwise. Each of these strategies faces considerable obstacles. Employment has suburbanized for a long list of reasons, including fundamental changes in transportation and communications technology. The postwar investment in suburban infrastructure is unlikely to be displaced by the modest funding of enterprise zones. Firms will continue to choose office parks near highway interchanges over sites near, for example, rail terminals they no longer require to move their products. And the political barriers to large-scale dispersal of the poor to suburban housing are obvious.

But there exists a third alternative that is already being tried in Milwaukee. In addition to rebuilding inner-city employment and to opening up the suburbs to inner-city residents (and, frankly, rather than hostage the fortunes of inner-city residents to our ability to do either of these), policy might instead attempt to create access to jobsites throughout the region for residents of the inner city. This mobility strategy, in which we seek to connect inner-city residents with suburban opportunities via information and transportation services, is a policy strategy that seeks to restore the viability of the inner city by connecting it to the realities of the modern metropolis. That is, it is a policy strategy that seeks to create a place for the inner city in the metropolis of the 1990s rather than recreate the inner city of the 1950s.

One of the nation's leading examples of a mobility strategy is the Wisconsin Job-Ride program.⁷ In 1989 the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WDOT) developed the Job-Ride Program to address the city's unemployment problem with a reverse commute strategy. Job-Ride is unusual because it is a publicly sponsored transportation program with a clear antipoverty purpose. Specifically, it subsidizes rides for inner-city residents to interviews and to jobs for a specific number of months (usually six) until the rider can purchase a car or establish alternative carpooling arrangements.

WDOT does not itself provide any of the employment or transportation services provided to program participants. Rather the department is a bridge-builder in the metropolitan region. Each year since Job-Ride's inception, WDOT has budgeted the program several hundred thousand dollars (\$494,000 in 1992). That money is divided among a small number of grantees, who bid for funds every three years. The department provides up to 80 percent of grantee operating costs.

Each of the grantees is a transportation venture operating a small fleet of vans as an adjunct to their central mission of job training and placement. Each grantee provides its riders counseling on interview techniques, advice on appropriate work apparel, and some level of job training. The Milwaukee Urban League, Goodwill Industries, Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Careers Council are major grantees of the program. As a whole, the program served nearly 1,700 persons in job searches and in part- and full-time placements in 1991. Over 750 people were placed in full-time jobs with average wages of \$5.40. Riders are typically charged \$1-2 per trip, and employers often contribute to the fare.

The basic innovation found in a program such as Job-Ride is the attempt to connect inner-city residents to suburban jobs without changing the location of either the residents or the employers. There remain many questions regarding the effectiveness of this approach. The most useful means of answering these questions would be a national demonstration effort. The most complete demonstration of the potential of the mobility strategy would consist of new and integrated programs that seek to provide training, placement, support, and transportation services in the explicit context of the new metropolitan reality. This means designing new program models to overcome the informational, organizational and transportation barriers caused by the severe separation of origin and destination. Federal legislation and foundation support has gathered around the need for a demonstration.

⁷ This information, as well as a discussion of other mobility initiatives from around the nation, is drawn from Mark Alan Hughes and Julie E. Sternberg, *The New Metropolitan Reality: Antipoverty Strategy Where the Rubber Meets the Road* (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1992).

Perhaps the most important reason for foundation and/or federal government involvement is the broader definition of success required by these particular programs. Most prior demonstration efforts, originating typically among transportation providers, have focused on sustainable ridership as the exclusive or dominant criterion for success. If seen more broadly as a mobility strategy rather than a transportation program, then a participant who substitutes a newly acquired private automobile for program transportation would be part of a successful outcome. Such an approach builds an ongoing subsidy into program design and places its aspirations for self-sufficiency in individual participants. As these participants are connected to opportunities, they may well discard certain parts of the program, especially the public and/or non-profit transportation. The compelling policy question is how to structure political and organizational incentives in order to seek these larger mobility goals. This is not a transportation program nor an employment program, but rather both of these, and more, at the same time. The central program-design question is how to cross these policy dimensions, just as we must cross the boundaries of city and suburb in order to confront the new metropolitan reality.

FIGURE ONE

LARGE METROPOLITAN AREAS
39 MSAs with Pop of 1 Million or more




FIGURE TWO

METROPOLITAN MILWAUKEE




FIGURE THREE




FIGURE FOUR




FIGURE FIVE

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE SIX

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE SEVEN




FIGURE EIGHT




FIGURE NINE




FIGURE TEN

TWENTY LARGEST CITIES

Ranked by % Change in Rates, 1980-90




FIGURE ELEVEN

METROPOLITAN MILWAUKEE




FIGURE TWELVE

METROPOLITAN MILWAUKEE




FIGURE THIRTEEN

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE FOURTEEN

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE FIFTEEN

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE SIXTEEN

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE SEVENTEEN




FIGURE EIGHTEEN

METROPOLITAN MILWAUKEE




FIGURE NINETEEN

METROPOLITAN MILWAUKEE




FIGURE TWENTY

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE TWENTY-ONE

CITY OF MILWAUKEE




FIGURE TWENTY-TWO




FIGURE TWENTY-THREE




FIGURE TWENTY-FOUR




FIGURE TWENTY-FIVE




FIGURE TWENTY-SIX




FIGURE TWENTY-SEVEN




FIGURE TWENTY-EIGHT




FIGURE TWENTY-NINE

